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THE COURT: All right. You may call the case, if you're ready.

THE CLERK: Yes, Your Honor. This is Civil Action Number 3:17CV72; Sines and others versus Kessler and others.

THE COURT: Are the plaintiffs ready?

MS. DUNN: We are, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Are the defendants ready?

MR. KOLENICH: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Of course, all of them are not here. before we begin, I will remind everyone that under Standing Order 2020-12, the Court's prohibition against recording and broadcasting court proceedings remains in force. Attorneys, parties, or staff, or members of the public or press accessing this hearing today may not record or broadcast it.

We're here today to hear argument on several motions in limine. The Court has resolved several that were previously set for argument today, but several remain. I would suggest we proceed with any argument in the following order: First hearing argument from the movant, then responses before proceeding to the next motion.

First we'll here Defendants Kessler, Damigo, and Identity Evropa's motion in limine and request for judicial

notice, that's Docket 1148; secondly, plaintiffs' motion in limine to preclude certain evidence of James Fields's communication, Docket 1153; and three, plaintiffs' motion to deem authentic certain photos or videos pertaining to Robert Azzmador Ray, Docket 1149.

Two other motions previously scheduled will not be heard today. The Court has been informed by the U.S. Marshal Service that Mr. Cantwell is still in transit; therefore, it would make sense to hold off on any argument until later this week on plaintiffs' motions to exclude several of Mr. Cantwell's trial witnesses.

The Court has also been informed this morning that
Bryan Jones, representing League of the South, will not attend
today's hearing due to scheduling conflicts with other cases.
The Court will not hear argument today, therefore, on the
League of the South defendant's motion in limine and request
for judicial notice. Mr. Jones has said he's willing to rest
on his briefing on that issue -- on the issue.

Once we are done with argument on the outstanding motions, the Court would like to ask the parties whether they think holding an extra Zoom hearing this week, perhaps Wednesday, could be productive before the final pretrial conference on Friday.

All right. We'll hear from -- on Motion 1,
Defendants Kessler, Damigo, and IE motion in limine.

MR. KOLENICH: Thank you, Your Honor. Jim Kolenich for those defendants.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KOLENICH: The motion in limine requests that the Court take judicial notice of search warrant affidavits and the accompanying search warrants that we only recently became aware of for the reason that these warrants were sealed, and the case number is listed in the motion. These warrants were issued relative to two named individuals, Miles and Moores -- I believe that's Lindsey Moores and Sarah Miles -- who are known to Defendant Kessler from prior political events to be what are called the anti-fascists. The search warrant affidavits filed by FBI agents indicate that the agents reviewed video and requested search warrants because they believed there was probable cause to believe that these two individuals, these two anti-fascists, had committed criminal offenses in Charlottesville on August -- I believe it's the 12th, limited to August 12th, 2017.

Now, the defense -- or I'm sorry, the plaintiffs have objected on the grounds that police reports ordinarily are excluded -- the contents of the reports -- on hearsay grounds; however, in order to be hearsay, of course, the statement has to be introduced for the truth of the matter asserted. And that isn't what defense seeks to use these warrants for.

Rather, we simply seek to show that an information was provided

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to the government -- in this case, Magistrate Judge Hoppe -and the magistrate judge found it demonstrated probable cause under the law to believe the criminal activity may have been committed by these two people. Therefore, it is not entirely unreasonable the jury shouldn't be denied this information that it was -- that the defendants believed the criminal activity was being engaged in by a certain class of counter protesters on August 12, 2017.

So that's the motion for judicial notice, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. KOLENICH: Sorry. Go ahead, sir.

THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. KOLENICH: Moving on, there are several other parts of the motion.

The second motion in limine is brought under federal Rule of Evidence 105, and it deals with the various sanctions that have been issued by the Court on motion of the plaintiffs. And we've -- there are at least three different parties that have been sanctioned. I believe the Court recently issued some sort of sanction against Defendant James Fields.

THE COURT: Let me ask you a question: Why isn't that something that's taken care of by a jury instruction?

MR. KOLENICH: Sorry, the Evidence Rule 105, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Well, I mean, in order to protect the

parties who were not sanctioned from having evidence of the sanction prejudicing the unsanctioned party, why wouldn't --

(Unreportable crosstalk).

THE COURT: Excuse me?

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MR. KOLENICH: I think the entire trial is going to be -- you know, as in the complaint, the plaintiffs are given to saying co-conspirator, co-conspirator about just about everybody. They're going to say conspired. You know, I think there is a very realistic danger the jury is going to be left with an incorrect impression that these sanctions -- that the sanctionable misconduct of these parties indicates that they conspired with the particular other defendant.

And so this motion -- this part of the motion in limine is an effort to avoid the defense having to object repeatedly every day during the trial to any plaintiff questions or implications regarding the sanctions establishing any facts against the non-sanctioned party. It may be -- I think we do have a proffered jury instruction. And it may be that the plaintiffs don't actually do that, and no objections will be made. But we -- the defense view is that this motion in limine to preclude them would be useful in focusing how they ask their questions and put in their case.

THE COURT: Well, it would be a normal procedure for the Court -- when any type of evidence like that is offered, for the Court to immediately instruct the jury that it can only

MR. KOLENICH: Pursuant to Mr. Mills's

representation -- I'm not sure I reviewed that particular jury

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instruction -- but if that is accurate, the defense doesn't have any big objection, as long as the Court is making instructions as we go along, as you indicated, and the plaintiffs have proposed an even better jury instruction than defense did. I think that issue would be adequately addressed, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Okay. Go ahead with any other argument you're making now.

MR. KOLENICH: Thank you, Your Honor.

Moving on in the defense motion, we have moved under various evidence -- Rules 401, 402, and 403 -- regarding relatives and friends of the party plaintiffs testifying. I think that the defense responsive pleading was directed at things that this motion doesn't actually ask for. All we're asking for is that the emotional effect on those witnesses of seeing the damages to the plaintiffs be excluded as evidence. I think that the witnesses would just sort of naturally talk about how they felt seeing their family members suffer as a result of the damages. This motion -- this part of the motion seeks to exclude that testimony.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Anything else?

MR. KOLENICH: We have terms. We have a motion

directed against terms. There are some example terms:

"Conspiracy, racial animus," and so forth. The motion is

directed at the sort of terms resulting in an emotional

reaction in the jury. So if they're constantly calling the plaintiffs Nazi, racists, and so forth prior to that becoming an established fact in the trial, we -- the defense asserts that that would be prejudicial under 403 to the defendants.

so we're just seeking a motion ahead of time to -- and then the plaintiffs have a similar motion regarding file names and titles that they filed recently. We're just seeking to restrict the rhetoric coming I guess from counsel, but also from the party plaintiffs. If they're going to constantly say racist, racist, racist before it's actually been established that there's a racial animus in any particular defendant, it's our assertion that that is prejudicial.

And I believe the last part of my motion, Your Honor, is directed to the testimony of the experts. It's a motion in limine seeking an order that the plaintiffs will observe the restrictions that were discussed at the motion hearing regarding these experts on December 17th, 2021. I'm sorry --

THE COURT: Didn't we resolve that at that time?

MR. KOLENICH: I think we did, Your Honor. It just seemed to me the better procedure was to bring it in a motion in limine that -- more or less that the Court is aware of what we resolved in December of 2020, and will enforce it upon the plaintiffs.

THE COURT: I assume the plaintiffs will follow the previous order and do what it said.

All right. Anything else?

MR. KOLENICH: No, Your Honor. I think that covers it. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Who is going to respond for the plaintiff?

MR. ISAACSON: Your Honor, this is Bill Isaacson from Paul Weiss for the plaintiffs. I can begin with the issue that Mr. Kolenich began with, the judicial notice of the search warrants and search warrant affidavits.

They're seeking that the Court tell the jury that there is a search warrant based on probable cause, and also that the Court tell the jury they are to take judicial notice of long affidavits about three individuals who these search warrants are two years after the events of Charlottesville.

And they want to argue that probable cause and the facts in those affidavits are a basis for their state of mind two years prior to the search warrants.

These don't meet the standards for judicial notice.

Judicial notice is obviously different from evidence because the Court is telling the jury what has been determined by the Court. It is extraordinary for search warrants all over America to all of a sudden be read to juries to say -- in cases where people want to say there is probable cause for something.

That is against the standards for judicial notice because, first, the search warrant affidavits themselves are

inadmissible evidence. Both the affidavits and the information within them that are hearsay and otherwise don't meet the rules of evidence, including authentication of photos and materials in them. Judicial notice is not an excuse for evading the rules of evidence and bringing in what otherwise couldn't be brought in.

The second is in order to have judicial notice is the facts have to be subject to no reasonable dispute. And by definition, an affidavit in a search warrant is subject to reasonable dispute because the people on the other side would dispute those facts. And plaintiffs in this case would also subject them, if they were to be brought into evidence, to cross-examination and to whatever replies with evidence that we thought were appropriate. It's not appropriate for the defendants to be asking for the Court to tip the scales by declaring certain things to have been found, and therefore that the jury is supposed to take judicial notice.

THE COURT: Well, let's -- you can stop. The search warrants are not -- the Court cannot take judicial notice of those. It's not proper. I think that would be in the realm of almost black letter law. I mean, it's just not -- it just wouldn't be -- it just doesn't fit the criteria.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ ISAACSON: Then I will pass the argument on to my colleagues.

THE COURT: All right.

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MR. MILLS: Your Honor, this is David Mills. I can address the issue -- although I think it may be resolved -- the issue of the spillover effect instruction. I think I heard Mr. Kolenich say that he would be fine with the instruction. And I would just read to you the instruction we proposed, which is to instruct the jury that: You are cautioned, however, that each party is entitled to have the case decided solely on the evidence that applies to that party. The facts being established which I just listed are admitted only as to Defendants Elliott Kline and Robert Azzmador Ray respectively; thus, taking those facts as true for this case as to Elliott Kline and Robert Azzmador Ray does not relieve plaintiffs of their burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the conduct committed by the other defendants in this case. That's the instruction that we propose, which is consistent with the Fourth Circuit's decision in United States versus Osuji. Mr. Kolenich, any problem with that? THE COURT: MR. KOLENICH: Not necessarily, Your Honor. think -- I think we may have some language in our proposed instructions, which I apologize, I don't have before me this morning. THE COURT: Well, you can let us know, and I'll -- I mean, it seems to be in the right direction.

MR. KOLENICH: It's a very strong instruction, Your

Sines, et al. v. Kessler, et al., 3:17CV72, 10/18/20211 Honor. Yeah, I don't have any problem with what he just read in and of itself. 2 3 THE COURT: Okay. Next? Mr. Mills, are you finished? 4 5 MR. MILLS: Yes, I am finished with that, and I pass the torch to Caitlin Munley. 6 7 THE COURT: Any further argument, then, on the defendants' motion? 8 9 MS. MUNLEY: Yes, Your Honor. MS. DUNN: Yes, Your Honor. I think the plaintiffs' 10 11 counsel who is speaking is on mute. 12 MS. MUNLEY: I apologize. I was on mute. 13 Good morning, Your Honor. I will be addressing the 14 two remaining issues in the motion regarding the introduction of emotional distress of non-witnesses [sic], and the use of 15 the terms "conspiracy" and "racial animus." 16 17 It sounds like defendants agree with us that we don't 18 intend to introduce any evidence of emotional distress of 19 non-parties, except we do want to point out that we think 20 defendants' motion is overly broad, and it places due intent to 21 introduce non-party testimony regarding two things: 22 Plaintiffs' emotional distress as a result of defendants' 23 conduct and nonparty witnesses' testimony about how they felt 24 or reacted to events they witnessed firsthand. We think both 25 of these are probative and relevant and not unduly prejudicial.

THE COURT: You'll need to repeat that. I'm having a little trouble hearing -- understanding you.

MS. MUNLEY: I apologize.

So plaintiffs do intend to introduce non-party testimony regarding the emotional distress that plaintiffs experienced as a result of defendants' conduct. It sounds like defendants are trying to limit those non-party witnesses from -- from testifying at all about their personal reactions to plaintiffs' injuries. These are -- these are plaintiffs' family members. They are plaintiffs' friends. It would undermine their credibility if they were not able to discuss at all the way that this affected plaintiffs and kind of the emotional distress. The other thing is that this testimony is corroborative of plaintiffs' injuries, and it has evidentiary value for plaintiffs' emotional distress claims and damages. So we would say that this -- the type of testimony that it seems like the defendants are trying to preclude is actually both relevant and probative.

THE COURT: Well, what I heard them objecting to was the witness saying -- the witness whom you would call to testify as to the plaintiffs' emotional distress telling -- the witness relating how the witness was distressed emotionally, as opposed to --

MS. MUNLEY: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I don't see that there is any

disagreement. I don't see why -- say if one of the plaintiffs' sisters were to say, I was very distressed when I heard about my sister being in the accident, I don't think that's particularly -- I don't see why that would be relevant or

admissible.

MS. MUNLEY: That's correct. We just don't want defendants to attempt to exclude any emotional reaction from plaintiffs' family or friends from witnessing either plaintiffs' injuries, or, if they were present, any kind of emotional reaction that they had to defendants' conduct.

THE COURT: Well, let me get this straight now. Say if you call one of the plaintiffs' mothers, you would -- do you anticipate that the mother would testify as to her -- the mother's distress?

MS. MUNLEY: No. But we would assume that the mother would have a visible emotional reaction that the jury would be able to see. And it is --

THE COURT: Okay. Well, that's -- I mean, as long as it's not obviously feigned, I would -- I don't know how -- the Court can't limit people's emotional reactions. But as I understood, what the defendant would be objecting to is the mother hypothetically -- the hypothetical mother saying how she was distressed at her daughter's experience, which I think would be inadmissible.

MS. MUNLEY: Correct. And we don't intend to

Sines, et al. v. Kessler, et al., 3:17CV72, 10/18/2021 1 introduce that testimony. 2 THE COURT: All right. Are you satisfied with that, 3 Mr. Kolenich? 4 MR. KOLENICH: Yes, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Was there anything else, then? 6 7 MS. MUNLEY: Yes, Your Honor. 8 I believe Mr. Kolenich also moved to preclude plaintiffs from using the terms "conspiracy, racial animus," or 9 any similar term or concept in either testimony, argument, or 10 questioning. Plaintiffs believe that this request is wildly 11 12 overbroad; it would be incredibly impractical; and it's 13 premature for a motion in limine. 14 First, defendants seek to limit the use of the terms "conspiracy, racial animus," and any similar term or concept, 15 16 which would make questioning and testimony almost impossible in 17 this case. Mr. Kolenich demonstrated the issues with this 18 motion in his argument in that he talked about a number of 19 terms that were not even mentioned in his motion. Because the 20 defendants do not define what they mean by "any similar term or 21 concept," there would be an enormous waste of judicial 22 resources and the parties' time and energy in trying to figure

out what language they were allowed to use at any point in the

trial. It would be extremely inefficient and it would be

extremely confusing for the jury. Plaintiffs are seeking to

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prove a conspiracy motivated by racial animus, and it would be absurd for them to have to try to do so without using any words relevant to conspiracy or racial animus.

THE COURT: I think the limitation would be you may not call one of the defendants a racist in maybe the opening statement or during the witness's testimony. You may not refer to the person as a racist. Now, what you can certainly in your opening statement say that you intend to prove that racial animus was a motivating factor. I mean, that -- I don't see any way you get around that. You have to talk about -- I mean, if it is -- the main count is a conspiracy. So you have to talk about -- use the term "conspiracy" when you discuss the issues in the case.

I think the -- sort of like in a criminal case, you don't start out -- it's argumentive to stand -- you know, for the prosecutor to start out pointing to the defendant: Now, the defendant is your rapist. I mean, generally you don't -- you know, that's -- you have to prove -- that's a matter of proof. And it's argumentive to start out calling -- I mean, plaintiffs shouldn't call the defendants racist in their opening statement. I mean, they can say what they're seeking to prove, but not the term -- pejorative terms themselves are not normally appropriate in an opening statement or when you have the witness on the stand.

MS. MUNLEY: And Your Honor, we don't disagree with

that. We just think this motion in itself is a premature motion. The more workable solution to the issues the defendants raise is for --

THE COURT: Mr. Kolenich, I mean, you heard what I said. It's hard to rule on something like that. I told the plaintiffs what my opinion is. And, of course, if you have to object to it, I'll try to see to it you don't have to object but once. And I will try to police any ruling that I make so that you're not having to hop up and down all the time, but I don't see how you avoid the terms coming in at appropriate times.

MR. KOLENICH: Thank you, Your Honor. Yes, as modified by plaintiffs' argument and the Court's observation, I guess the motion as written is just a little bit overbroad and unworkable. So I understand what the Court is saying and have no objection.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Okay. Were there any other defendants -- are those defendants' motions?

MR. SMITH: Your Honor, Josh Smith. I represent

David Matthew Parrott, Matthew Heimbach, and Traditionalist

Worker Party.

I know it's, I suppose, not my turn to speak. I just wanted to sort of point out that one of the reasons why I attended the hearing this morning was that I wanted to bring up

Sines, et al. v. Kessler, et al., 3:17CV72, 10/18/2021 1 several matters with the Court that I haven't had an 2 opportunity to bring up with the Court yet because I'm fairly 3 new to the case. 4 THE COURT: Well, why don't we go through the agenda. 5 MR. SMITH: Of course. I only said that just 6 because --7 THE COURT: I'll allow you to speak at the end, 8 afterwards. 9 MR. SMITH: Fantastic. That's great. THE COURT: All right. We have plaintiffs' motion in 10 11 limine to preclude James Fields -- certain of James Fields's 12 communications, 1153. Who is --13 MR. SANCHEZ: Good morning, Your Honor. Giovanni 14 Sanchez, Paul Weiss, on behalf of the plaintiffs. I will be addressing that motion. 15 16 THE COURT: All right. 17 MR. SANCHEZ: Your Honor, as you know, in that motion 18 we seek to preclude defendants from offering evidence that 19 Detective Young or any other law enforcement officers did not 20 find communications between Defendant Fields and other people 21 who attended or organized UTR. Now, in their response to that 22 motion, defendants did not dispute that that's a form of 23 negative evidence. They also did not dispute that it would be 24 inadmissible if they could not establish the proper foundation. 25 Their only main argument is that at this time it's premature

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for the Court to rule on that issue. And we respectfully submit, Your Honor, that the record, as it stands today, is more than clear that they will be unable to establish a proper foundation for that testimony. And in particular, I want to focus on three aspects why that's true.

The first reason that's true is that no law enforcement officer, including Young, could have known the identity of all the relevant people. Now, we know that must be true because not only would it be infeasible for them to know all the people who attended the rally; but more specifically, they wouldn't even know particular subgroups that are very important and central to the case. For example, and probably most notably, they wouldn't know the identity of the membership of Vanguard. And we know that must be the case because the leadership of Vanguard, such as Hopper, testified under oath that he himself did not know the identity of the members. And that was, as the Court has previously recognized, a deliberate tactic they use to shroud their membership's secrecy. Now, that's notable because we know that Defendant Fields marched with Vanguard. He carried their shield. He wore their uniform. That's the first reason.

The second reason is that even assuming Detective
Young knew some of the relevant identities, there is nothing
beyond a speculative chance that he would know all of the
aliases and user names. Now, this is a very important point

because the record is peppered with examples of how multiple defendants and conspirators in the case used an array of different aliases as they were engaging one another on different digital media platforms. As just one example, Fields himself had half a dozen different aliases that he was using online. And often those aliases were not tied in any obvious way to their legal or given name. For example, Fields's Instagram handle was BigBoss1337.

Now, this issue, this issue about the aliases is further compounded by the problem we have that we became aware of through the testimony of Rousseau, another leader of Vanguard. And that's that often they would use digital profiles that would expire within weeks. Now, they did this often to evade a lot of the bands they would get on certain platforms. So it's very possible that not only would he not know the different aliases because he couldn't tie them to particular identities, but also because the identities just might have expired after a given time. That's the second reason.

The third reason is that even assuming Detective

Young might have become aware of some of the identities and

might have been able to tie those identities to some of the

aliases, there's a problem about the use of auto-delete

features. And this is again coming from sworn testimony from

Vanguard's leadership, and that we know that it was a practice

of Vanguard -- and perhaps of other defendants -- that when they would use certain messaging platforms, they would engage what's called an auto-delete feature. And the auto-delete feature would just make messages go away, would erase messages sometimes within a period as short as 12 hours. And so for spans of weeks and months of when messages were exchanged on certain platforms, they would have been erased and no one would access to them, not even law enforcement, as far as we're aware.

Now, each of those three reasons we think is sufficient to show that as the record stands today, they have not established a proper foundation. But there's one more point that I think kind of underscores all of this, is that each of those points assumes that a focus of law enforcement's investigation was tying Fields to the conspirators in this case. And plaintiffs have reason to believe that that was never a central focus of the investigation. Based on my colleagues' interactions with law enforcement, we believe it's fair to say that those connections were never fully explored to the extent that they would have been explored in this case. And so in some sense there's just a fundamental misalignment between the investigation that law enforcement officials conducted and the facts that are relevant to establish the foundation for that testimony in this case.

So for each of those reasons, we think they cannot

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establish a proper foundation. Now, even assuming they establish -- they are able to establish some minimal foundation for some limited testimony, we think in that case they should still be precluded under Rule 403. The most illuminating case on that issue is the *Forrest* case in the Third Circuit, which we cited in our brief. And because I think it will be helpful, I'd like to dive into the facts of that case just a little bit, if Your Honor would allow it.

So in that case, in the Forrest case, the key issue was whether or not there was a design defect that injured the plaintiffs. And the witnesses that the defendants intended to use in that case had decades of experience with the machine that injured the plaintiff. They knew its ins and outs. They worked with it every day for over 30 years. They had more than sufficient knowledge about that one particular machine so that they could speak on it with -- you know, consistent with the rules of evidence. But what the Court in Forrest recognized is that one machine was just a small part of the relevant universe of evidence. The relevant universe of evidence included all of the machines that had been designed. And so the problem with that testimony is that it would appear to the jury very concrete, very tangible, highly probative; but really that was misleading and that was confusing, and it would cause them to generalize and speculate in a way the rules of evidence do not permit them.

And we think there's a similar problem here, because to the extent they can establish some minimal foundation for the evidence that came from the phone, that phone is just one small piece of all of the relevant communications that might tie Fields to the conspiracy. Obviously, there is other devices. There is the possibility of digital burner phones, which I talked about earlier. There is the possibility of messages being erased. And even putting all of the digital aspects aside, there is the ample communication that happened in person at UTR that there is no dispute that law enforcement officers do not have the full array of evidence regarding those communications.

So in the same way that the machine -- the testimony in Forrest would have been about a single machine, and would have led the jury to be misled based on that single small part of the evidence, the same applies here. The jury would be confused about Detective Young's testimony about one specific device when there's a host of other communications that are relevant, including communications that happened at UTR itself where Fields very likely might have joined the conspiracy.

So for all those reasons, Your Honor, we think this evidence should be excluded both because defendants cannot offer -- and I invite them to proffer some reason where they could establish foundation; I don't think they will be able to -- proper foundation for this testimony. But again, even if

they could, Your Honor, we think it should be precluded under 403.

THE COURT: All right, sir.

Who will respond?

MR. KOLENICH: Your Honor, Jim Kolenich for the defendants -- well, for my clients, Your Honor.

All right. So the plaintiffs -- this motion is seeking to exclude, as I understand it, Detective Young in total, that we won't even be able to present him as a witness at all. The case that plaintiff relies on that was just discussed ably by counsel didn't mention the fact that the Forrest case did not exclude this testimony pretrial, but allowed the parties in that action to try to establish the foundation at trial. And that, as noted, is our entire presentation and response --

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I think we can sort of stop the argument on it. At this point, I have -- it does not appear that the foundation has been laid, but what I would rule is that this shouldn't be mentioned in opening statement unless you present something to the Court that you can lay a proper foundation, or if you proceed -- if you intend to call a witness to testify, that you take it up with the Court first, that there be -- and show that the foundation can be laid.

What is the question -- ultimate question you would ask the witness?

MR. KOLENICH: Your Honor, Detective Young testified that he found no evidence linking James Fields to anybody else -- anybody else, whether defendants in this case or not, as to his criminal act.

Now, the plaintiffs well observed that he -- this argument about the universe of possible evidence is not a completely off-base argument. I believe Detective Young did testify at deposition that other electronic devices were acquired by other law enforcement agencies, specifically federal law enforcement. The detective also testified that federal law enforcement never told him that they found any evidence of a conspiracy on those other devices.

So we would be calling him for the limited purpose of the stuff he did look at. Did you find any conspiracy? And it is a fact of the case, and it is the defense position, that it is prejudicial to the defense to deny the jury access to this fact, that the police did not charge anybody else in connection with James Fields's criminal act. Now, admittedly, that's potentially a little bit more negative evidence. Ordinarily law enforcement inaction would not be admissible as to effect, but in this case law enforcement took action, both sovereigns, both state and federal charged Fields with murder, convicted him. If memory served, he's sentenced to more than 400 years in prison. And they didn't charge anybody else. This is a fact that is relevant and should be admissible in this case.

So no, we're not calling Detective Young to say that there is no evidence, and that his investigation establishes there is no evidence of communication or conspiratorial communications with anybody else or any other defendant in this case. We are calling him for the limited purpose of what he certainly observed and can testify to. He didn't find any. The FBI told him they didn't find any, or at least never told him that they found any. And neither of these prosecutorial authorities ever charged anybody else with a crime, not so much as littering, in relation to James Fields's actions. I think the jury should be able to hear that, Your Honor, at some point.

Certainly it's absolutely inaccurate that there is no foundation for that right now as we speak in the wake of the deposition. The fact of the matter is plaintiffs didn't ask any of these questions to this witness. They wanted to rely on this argument instead. However, I understand the Court wants a proffer, and that's all the proffer we can make. I think we should be allowed to mention at opening that there is nobody else charged with a crime. We object to a court order that precludes us from doing that. But the remainder of it I think is understood and sort of ordinary procedure that —

THE COURT: All right. Well, okay. The ruling at this time, though, is that there is no proper foundation laid.

An opinion that based on what other people may have told him or

Sines, et al. v. Kessler, et al., 3:17CV72, 10/18/2021 1 what other people didn't tell him, I don't -- I don't see any 2 way that that is admissible. 3 MR. KOLENICH: Well, can we at least say, Your Honor, 4 that no one else was charged with a crime at opening? 5 THE COURT: Well, that's not the issue in this particular case. I mean, a crime, of course, the burden of 6 7 proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. And there are lots of 8 decisions that go into whether to prosecute someone or not. 9 And I think you're getting into the realm of speculation and 10 all sorts of reasons why someone was or was not prosecuted. 11 Fields was sort of the obvious person to be prosecuted, but I 12 don't -- I think it's sort of going down a rabbit trail when 13 you start talking about no one else was prosecuted. Then we 14 have to get into why, and speculating on why or why not. so I don't think it's -- I don't think it's proper, and I rule 15 that it would not be admissible. 16 17 MR. SMITH: Isn't it okay for the jury to speculate, 18 Your Honor, on that, just by saying -- you know, isn't it 19 proper for the jury to say, well, there was no one else 20 charged, so there must not have been any kind of conspiracy, 21 because if -- if the police would have found evidence of it, 22 they would have charged somebody. I think in a case like this

THE COURT: Well, I --

with this much publicity --

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MR. KOLENICH: I'm sorry, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, who's speaking?

MR. SMITH: Oh, Josh Smith. I don't -- I have --

THE COURT: You know, I mean, what the jury does in its own mind, God only knows. I don't think it's proper evidence.

MR. SMITH: It's a high publicity case.

THE COURT: If it comes in, then you can -- I mean, you certainly can argue, well, no one else was charged with a crime in this particular case, and therefore there was no conspiracy. That would -- that doesn't follow. I mean, a criminal conspiracy is entirely a different matter.

MR. SMITH: Well, it's a very high publicity case.

THE COURT: You have to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. And there are charging decisions made by prosecutors all the time that -- you know, we have situations that come up and prosecutors don't charge everyone. And we get -- we would get off -- off into left field trying to handle why the prosecutors may not have charged someone else.

MR. SMITH: Your Honor, in a case like this with this much publicity, it seems like if there was any even inkling --

THE COURT: Well, there's just no legal merit to that argument, sir, that a case with this much publicity. That has nothing to do with whether this is admissible. I just have to rule that it's not admissible, okay?

All right. Anything else?

Sines, et al. v. Kessler, et al., 3:17CV72, 10/18/2021 1 MR. SANCHEZ: That's all for this motion, Your Honor. 2 I'm also presenting argument on the motion regarding Ray, the 3 motion to authenticate the photos and videos regarding Defendant Ray. If you want, I can move on to that motion. 4 5 THE COURT: All right. Go ahead. 6 MR. SANCHEZ: As to that motion, Your Honor, we 7 just --8 THE COURT: Is there any opposition to that motion, 9 though, at this point? 10 MR. SANCHEZ: That's the point I was just about to 11 make, that it's unopposed; and for that reason, we're willing 12 to rest on our brief, unless the Court has any specific 13 questions we'd be more than happy to address. 14 THE COURT: Okay. I felt it was not opposed. MR. SANCHEZ: That's correct. 15 16 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else, then, from the 17 plaintiff? 18 MR. SANCHEZ: That's all for me, Your Honor. 19 my colleagues may have more arguments, but that's all for me. 20 THE COURT: Okay. Did the plaintiff have any other 21 argument? 22 All right. If not, Mr. Smith, I'll entertain 23 anything you wanted to bring up. 24 MR. SMITH: Yes, thank you, Your Honor. So there

were -- so I'm fairly new to the case. I've only been on for

about six weeks. So I'm in the process of catching up. It's been -- you know, it's been a lot of work to get up to speed with -- at least, you know, to the degree that I would like to be. So I may be running behind on a few things. I'll make the necessary motions to file certain things late, if -- but -- which brings me to my first point, actually. I was going to ask the Court if it would be okay if David Matthew Parrott, Matthew Heimbach, and Traditionalist Worker Party presented their case in chief last in the order of defendants.

THE COURT: What I would say normally, if the defendants can get together and decide the order in which they wish to present their case and their argument, that's fine with the Court; however, there being no agreement, I would normally take the list of defendants in the order that they are sued and let it proceed that way, if I were making the decision.

MS. DUNN: Your Honor, this is Ms. Dunn for the plaintiffs. I have something to say that might inform this discussion and reorient it in an important way, if I may.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. DUNN: Your Honor and Mr. Smith, I think as

Mr. Smith is aware, plaintiffs plan to call his clients in our

case in chief, because in order to prove our case, we need to

call the defendants adversely. And so I think Mr. Smith's

question begs a different question, which is whether he will

put on his direct examination of his clients when we call his

clients in our case in chief. It doesn't matter to us whether Mr. Heimbach and Mr. Parrott appear twice, once in our case in chief and once in Mr. Smith's. And, of course, that order is up to Mr. Smith and the defendants and the Court. But just so everyone is aware, we do, and we must, in order to prove our case, have to call his clients adversely.

THE COURT: All right. Okay. Mr. Smith?

MR. SMITH: You know, that sounds like an excellent time-saving idea. And I think under normal circumstances if I had been on the case longer, that might be something that would be beneficial. Here I think it's probably best if the plaintiffs call my clients adversely, and then I still examine them -- conduct direct examination of them in my clients' case in chief so that they can tell their story in an appropriate way at an appropriate time for the jury.

THE COURT: All right. I mean, that's --

MR. SMITH: As Your Honor said, I can talk to the other defendants about it. I didn't know if the Court was -- if the Court wanted something like that or if it was just going to set the order.

THE COURT: I try to let you try your case. If there's no objection to anything, I don't interfere.

MR. SMITH: So of course this is premature anyway. So I'm sorry about that. That does take care of that.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. SMITH: So there was an emergency motion that we put before the Court asking for a protective order to preclude extrajudicial statements by parties, their counsel, and a particular organization that's funding this litigation. Now, I suppose it's possible that the motion got lost in the slew of motions that Christopher Cantwell filed on the docket and -- or something. I think that the thing that we had feared in that motion, that there was going to be this online rally that IFA --

THE COURT: Excuse me. On the motion you just spoke of, I think that was referred to Judge Hoppe. That may be something -- I don't know whether he's ruled on it or not.

MR. SMITH: Yeah, I don't think there's been a ruling on it yet, Your Honor. I was just sort of updating the Court. They had this rally. My clients -- IFA committed defamation per se against my clients. She said that they were continuing to -- that the defendants were, quote, continuing to threaten or continued to threaten their team, meaning I assume plaintiffs' counsel or somebody. What they alleged was a crime. It's completely untrue. It's defamation per se. And it's exactly what we had feared. It contaminates the jury pool. It's wildly inappropriate. It's actionable legally. This organization, again, funds this litigation. They shouldn't be making statements like that and attempting to prejudice potential jurors, especially with a trial of -- you

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   know, so much has gone into this trial, it's been going on for
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   so long, to endanger it like that --
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             THE COURT: What's the plaintiffs' position
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   regarding --
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             MR. SMITH: Well, IFA has put in --
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             MS. DUNN: Your Honor --
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             THE COURT: Hold on. Let me see if there is any
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   argument about it first. Who's speaking for the plaintiff?
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             MS. DUNN: Your Honor, this is Karen Dunn for the
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   plaintiffs. There was an opposition to Mr. Smith's motion
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   filed by attorneys for IFA, who are not on this phone call.
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   IFA is a separate organization that has its own counsel.
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   counsel's name is Mr. Andrew Celli. He has filed with the
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           I presume that opposition went to Judge Hoppe. And my
   recommendation would be to put this over until that counsel can
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   be on the phone and properly handle the opposition.
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             THE COURT: All right. Well, it does -- if the
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   plaintiffs are being threatened by anyone, they should be
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   reporting it to the FBI or the Marshals. It shouldn't be --
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    they shouldn't be calling someone else and someone else putting
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   out a press release on it. It ought to be handled.
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             MR. SMITH: That's why we asked for a protective
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   order.
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             MS. DUNN: We agree, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: With Mr. Smith, it would be highly
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inappropriate for those kind of -- and if someone is involved heavily in the case, whether they are a party or not, they shouldn't be -- shouldn't be doing that.

MS. DUNN: We understand and agree, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Smith, anything else?

MR. SMITH: So I think that another issue that I had written down here was that the Court recently made a decision on the Heaphy reports. And I was going to ask the Court if it would like to reconsider that in light of the residual exception to the hearsay rule, which doesn't appear to have been discussed in the Court's opinion. I'm not sure if it was raised by other -- if it was raised by other defendants, but I would like the opportunity to raise it with the Court.

The residual -- this really seems like a case where the residual exception fits quite well. This is the only -- the Heaphy report is the only independent report of these events conducted by anyone ever. These are -- this is an extraordinary case, Your Honor, in many ways. And the plaintiffs, of course, admit this all the time. They say this case is extraordinary. The residual --

THE COURT: Mr. Smith, look, almost all rulings are susceptible to motions to reconsider. And I think probably what you need to do -- should do is file a short motion and state your position and the Court can rule on it.

MR. SMITH: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I don't particularly want to get into the argument at this point because I doubt that others are prepared to respond.

MR. SMITH: I do know that the plaintiffs had briefed the issue. I believe, if I'm not mistaken, they had included that in their brief on it, which was -- because obviously they had been planning to file that for a while. It was like 15 pages or something.

I'm trying to -- I'm trying to -- given that there's so little time before trial and I'm really working to get up to speed on everything, I'm trying to limit the number of things I have to write or the length of those things. So I apologize in advance if the things that I end up filing with the Court aren't as lengthy as the Court is used to.

THE COURT: Well, lengthiness is not the virtue I'm concerned about. It's just, you know, we have I think by now probably hundreds of motions in this case. And we're trying to move on and take care of them as we can. I note what you're saying. If you want to file a motion to reconsider, it doesn't have to be long.

MR. SMITH: Of course, Your Honor.

Another thing -- this actually goes to what

Mr. Kolenich was saying before -- I don't think that -- there

are certain terms that we're talking about -- I believe

Mr. Kolenich wanted to limit certain terms like "conspiracy" or

"racial animus" or something like that. There's only -there's a couple -- a couple of terms that -- sort of
pejoratives that I'm hearing a lot in this case, and I don't
think that they -- they're subjective terms without any kind of
coherent, agreed-upon definition. And I don't think they
should be used to refer to, well, any of the defendants, but
particularly my clients. Those terms are "white supremacist"
and "neo-Nazi." It's hard to even understand what those terms
mean. But my clients don't identify themselves that way, and I
don't think that we should be referring to people by things
they don't refer to themselves as.

THE COURT: Well, they are pejorative terms.

MR. SMITH: They're also inaccurate.

THE COURT: I've said that, you know, the plaintiffs should not be referring to these people -- you know, calling someone names. And I think they agreed to that. It's not something in the opening statement you would call somebody a white supremacist or some other -- racist, or anything like that. But it's hard to say you can't bring up a term in a case like this when --

MR. SMITH: Yeah, obviously the no conspiracy thing, well, that seems like -- you know, how would you do that in a case where there is allegations of conspiracy? But --

THE COURT: I mean, maybe you can correct me, but there are persons who do not take the term -- if they were

Sines, et al. v. Kessler, et al., 3:17CV72, 10/18/2021called a white supremacist, they wouldn't take that as an 1 2 insult. 3 MR. SMITH: Well, it's just generally not accurate. 4 I mean, if they refer to themselves that way --5 THE COURT: But everyone doesn't necessarily take -you know, I mean, I'm reminded of a case that we had where the 6 7 lawyer told him -- this is a true story -- the lawyer told the a jury, Insulting words depends on who says them, and to whom, 9 and the circumstances. And he said, For instance, you may call me a name I would take as a grievous insult, whereas His Honor 10 11 would take it as a compliment. 12 You know, that's the way things are. Different 13 people may be proud -- people are proud of their beliefs. MR. SMITH: I mean, usually --14 15 THE COURT: What I'm saying, though -- I mean, I've 16 already said it's not appropriate to call somebody a name -- a 17 pejorative name. 18 MR. SMITH: Right. Exactly. 19 THE COURT: That type of thing. And if it happens, 20 you know, object to it. And I will try to police the 21 objections so that you won't be jumping up and down. I don't 22 think the plaintiff intends to do that, or at least they 23 indicate they don't. I think it's not appropriate and --24 MR. SMITH: Thank you. I'm satisfied with that, Your 25 Honor.

THE COURT: You can't rule out the use of certain words during the trial in all circumstances. It's not appropriate in every circumstance to call somebody a certain name, even though other people wouldn't -- some people wouldn't think it's insulting.

Who was trying to speak?

MS. DUNN: Sorry, Your Honor. This is Ms. Dunn. I just -- for clarity, because I don't think we want openings -- anybody's openings in this case interrupted by many objections, I think we just should bring some clarity to the situation.

I don't think anybody expects to jump up in court and say in opening statement, Matthew Heimbach is a Nazi. I do think it is impossible, given the evidence in this case, not to say that you will see evidence of Nazi imagery, that you will see evidence that white nationalists came to Charlottesville.

And I think that we very much will say what we intend to prove. And then, you know, I think the jury will see the evidence, and the witnesses will be on the stand for direct and cross. But I think, you know, I just want to bring some clarity to the situation, because part of our responsibility in this case is to prove that the defendants acted with racial animus. So we have to tell the jury that we plan to prove that, and to say you're going to see evidence, and to show them what they're going to see in the case. So that's --

THE COURT: Well, I think I've said that that's

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Sines, et al. v. Kessler, et al., 3:17CV72, 10/18/2021
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   appropriate --
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             MS. DUNN: I just want to make sure.
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             THE COURT: -- that you don't say Joe Smith here is a
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   Nazi or some other -- or a neo-Nazi or whatever. I mean, you
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   can say you're going to present evidence of those symbols. I
   think certain symbols are Nazi symbols. And I don't know how
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   you try the case without --
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             MR. SMITH: I'm fine with what Ms. Dunn said. And I
   don't mind the term "white nationalist." I don't care about
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          It's more the white supremacist, neo-Nazi, or those
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   kinds of terms.
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             THE COURT: I think you're all on the same page here.
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   It just has to be handled at trial if there is any infraction.
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             MS. DUNN:
                       Thank you, Your Honor.
             MR. SMITH: I just have one more thing, Your Honor,
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16
   and thank you for being so patient --
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             THE COURT: All right.
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             MR. SMITH: -- with all this stuff. I'm trying to
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   get it all on a list to tell you all at once.
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             THE COURT: Go ahead.
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             MR. SMITH: I was wondering -- and Mr. Bloch is on
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    this call, so I can just ask anyway. I just need to ask:
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   it possible that the Court can -- well, I don't know if the
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   Court needs to order it, or if I can just make this request of
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   Mr. Bloch, but I need to get copies of plaintiffs' -- all the
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Sines, et al. v. Kessler, et al., 3:17CV72, 10/18/2021 1 exhibits on plaintiffs' exhibit list, most recent exhibit list. 2 Having not been with this case for a very long time, I'm sure 3 those exhibits are spread all over the case, and I just don't 4 have them. And I really would like to be able to review them 5 so I know what to object to. 6 MR. BLOCH: Judge, this is Michael Bloch for the 7 plaintiffs. I'm happy to call Mr. Smith offline and work this 8 I know he's new to the case and getting up to speed, and 9 there's a huge volume of evidence. And I'm happy to $- ext{--}$ 10 MR. SMITH: Thanks. I appreciate it. 11 MR. BLOCH: -- point him in the right direction. 12 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 13 MR. SMITH: That's everything, Your Honor. Thank you 14 very much. 15 THE COURT: Anything else? 16 MR. SMITH: That's all. Thank you, Your Honor. 17 appreciate it. MS. DUNN: 18 Your Honor, from the plaintiffs there are 19 a couple of housekeeping items we just wanted to flag for the 20 Court. 21 THE COURT: All right. 22 MS. DUNN: One is that we're hoping, prior to the 23 start of trial, to get a ruling on the sanctions motion against 24 Mr. Heimbach. So we just wanted to mention that.

We wanted to flag for the Court that we -- we have

Sines, et al. v. Kessler, et al., 3:17CV72, 10/18/2021 1 filed I think yesterday two other motions. One is to exclude Daryl Davis as a witness. And the other, as was mentioned 2 3 earlier, is a motion to preclude argumentive file names of evidence, since the file names will go to the jury; and also, 4 5 in that same motion, to exceed the megabyte limit of Box, 6 because some of the exhibits in this case are very big. 7 So we just wanted to flag those for the Court. 8 THE COURT: All right. Okay. We'll -- I'll see if 9 my clerk got that down. 10 MS. DUNN: Then two other things, but I know the 11 Court mentioned at the beginning of this hearing that you may 12 set another Zoom for this week. So we can wait, or happy to 13 bring up those few things now, if there is not going to be a Zoom later this week. 14 15 THE COURT: Okay. What's the general feeling about 16 another conference during the week? It looks like Wednesday 17 would be the best day for us. 18 MR. SMITH: I think that sounds great, Your Honor. 19 MS. DUNN: Yeah, for the plaintiffs that sounds 20 wonderful, and we appreciate Your Honor's willingness to do it. 21 THE COURT: Okay. Let me check to see what would be 22 a good time. Excuse me just a minute. 23 Okay. Would 9:30 Wednesday be okay? 24 MS. DUNN: Yes for the plaintiffs, Your Honor.

MR. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor, that's great.

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             THE COURT: We may have -- we may be able to take up
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    some of the motions on Wednesday that --
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             MR. KOLENICH: Your Honor, it's Jim Kolenich. I'm
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   not available Wednesday at 9:30.
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             THE COURT: You're not?
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             MR. KOLENICH: No, sir.
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             THE COURT: Are you available any time Wednesday?
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             MR. KOLENICH: Yes, sir, any time from 11:30 forward.
             THE COURT: All right. How about 1:00 with everyone
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   else?
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             MR. SMITH: That's great, Your Honor.
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             MS. DUNN: Yes, Your Honor, for the plaintiffs that
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   works.
           Thank you.
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             MR. LEVINE: Your Honor, Wednesday at 1 p.m?
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             THE COURT: Yes. Is that okay?
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             MR. LEVINE: I think Mr. Bloch should check with
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   Ms. Kaplan. I'm not sure Wednesday afternoon works for her or
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   for me.
            I don't have to be in attendance unless Your Honor
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   proposes that we argue the motion as to --
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             THE COURT: I'm sorry, I'm not sure who's speaking,
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   and you're breaking up.
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             THE REPORTER: This is the court reporter.
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   having trouble hearing you as well.
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             MR. SANCHEZ: Your Honor, it was Alan Levine
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   speaking. He was saying he may not be able to attend on
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Okay. If not, we'll meet again on Wednesday at 1 p.m. Thank you all. I appreciate you being here. We'll recess now.

(Proceedings concluded, 10:39 AM)

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CERTIFICATE

I, Lisa M. Blair, RMR/CRR, Official Court Reporter for the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, appointed pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 753, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the proceedings reported by me using the stenotype reporting method in conjunction with computer-aided transcription, and that same is a true and correct transcript to the best of my ability and understanding.

I further certify that the transcript fees and format comply with those prescribed by the Court and the Judicial Conference of the United States.

/s/ Lisa M. Blair Date: October 19, 2021